This paper evaluates the welfare effects of bundling in multi-channel (cable and satellite) television markets. It estimates the distributions of preferences and costs for over 80 multi-channel television networks, the critical parameters necessary for accurately measuring the welfare consequences of bundling. Using these parameter estimates, we conduct counterfactual simulations of alternativeà la carte policies, i.e. policies that require cable and satellite systems to unbundle (at least some of) the networks they sell to consumers. Our (preliminary) estimates are sensible and suggest possibly significant consumer welfare gains fromà la carte. The impact of anà la carte on outcomes in the wholesale programming market is an important factor in determining consumer benefits. * Preliminary and incomplete: Please do not cite or quote. Comments welcome. We would like to thank
In this paper, we estimate models of demand for and pricing of multi-channel television services and use these to simulate counterfactual outcomes of alternativeà la carte pricing policies. 3 An important challenge in so doing is recovering estimates of the distribution of household preferences for individual programming networks. We do so by exploiting the two-sided nature of multi-channel television markets: cable and satellite systems sell access to (bundles of) program networks to households, but they (or the networks provided on them) also sell audiences to advertisers. We have collected a rich set of aggregate data on market outcomes in both of these markets -market shares and prices for a sample of over 5,000 cable and satellite systems over 11 years and aggregate weekly cable ratings data for a sample of 80 cable networks across 50 DMAs over 6 years -in order to measure the potential impacts ofà la carte policies.
We begin by building an econometric model of household and firm behavior in multi-channel television markets that can exploit this data. The starting point is a model of viewer choice. We assume households have preferences over the programming offered on different television networks and that they watch those networks they most prefer. For each household, this yields two outcomes of interest: the time they devote to watching each network and the total value (surplus) that access to all networks provides. As we observe only aggregate market outcomes, we proceed by aggregating across the assumed distribution of households within markets and relating each of these measures to their observed counterparts in the data.
For computational reasons we do this in two stages. In the first stage of the estimation, we use our ratings data to recover estimates of the distribution of tastes for individual cable networks. We first recover the impact of demographic factors on preferences for networks by exploiting the covariation across markets in ratings and demographics. 4 We then recover the distribution of unobservable preferences for networks (controlling for demographic differences). As in recent models of demand estimation using aggregate market data (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1997) ), we do so by exploiting the variance and covariance of aggregate ratings across markets and time. If, for example, ratings for ESPN2 and ESPN positively co-vary, this suggests preferences for the two networks are positively correlated.
In the second stage of the estimation, we take these parameters as given and estimate the demand for and pricing of cable services consisting of bundles of these networks. This yields estimates of the distribution of preferences for income and the inside good (including broadcast networks), as well as the marginal costs of providing each network as part of the bundle. These are all the critical components for conducting our counterfactualà la carte policy simulations.
Our preliminary estimation results are reasonable. The estimated distribution of preferences for cable networks varies as expected with both observed and unobserved factors. For example, Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) for BET (Black Entertainment Television) is estimated to be significantly higher in DMAs with more black households. Similarly, WTP for Discovery Times or Galavision is estimated to be higher in markets having households with more college or masters degrees and having more Hispanic households, respectively. Estimates for the variance and covariance of tastes are also reasonable: estimated variances are higher for networks with higher means and estimated covariances (in unobserved tastes) are positive for networks offering similar content (e.g. ESPN/ESPN2/ESPNews) and negative for networks offering very different content. Estimated own-price elasticities for Expanded Basic cable and satellite services range from -1.94 to -2.16.
We next use these estimates to simulate the welfare effects of alternativeà la carte pricing regimes.
[INSERT ALC RESULTS HERE]
The balance of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the multi-channel television industry and the institutional and regulatory factors that influence household and firm behavior in the industry. Section 3 describes the data: the quantities measured, how they were collected, and various shortcomings. Section 4 specifies the model's assumptions and their relation to the empirical evidence. Section ?? presents the results of our estimation and addresses implications of those results. Section 7 measures the consequences of alternativeà la carte policy proposals. Section 9 concludes.
The Multi-Channel Television Industry
The multi-channel television market is a classic example of two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole (2006) ). Cable and satellite systems provide a platform connecting households and program producers/advertisers. We denote the market in which households purchase access to television programming the Content Market. When consumers watch programs, their consumption creates another product, audiences. We denote the market in which cable or satellite television systems (or the networks on them) sell audiences to advertisers the Advertising Market. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the supply chain by which content is produced and sold to households and audiences are created and sold to advertisers. Downward arrows represent the flow of programming from Content Providers to Households. 5 Upward arrows represent the creation and sale of audiences to advertisers. 6 The various sub-markets that characterize the purchase and sale of content or audiences are indicated at each step in the chain. In this paper, we focus on the for-pay (i.e. subscription) program distribution and advertising markets.
Insert Figure 1 Here

The MVPD Market
Multi-Channel Television Services: Bundles of Program Networks Cable television systems choose a portfolio of television networks, bundle them into services, and offer these services to consumers in local, geographically separate, markets. Satellite television systems similarly choose and bundle networks into services, but offer them to consumers on a national basis.
All cable and satellite systems offer four main types of program networks. Broadcast networks are advertising-supported television signals broadcast over the air in the local cable market by television stations and then collected and retransmitted by cable systems. Examples include the major, national broadcast networks -ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX -as well as public and independent television stations. Cable programming networks are advertising-and fee-supported general and 5 The distribution rights to most content (e.g. a television program like "Crocodile Hunter") is purchased by a Television Network (e.g. CBS or The Discovery Channel) and placed in its programming lineup (see, e.g., Owen and Wildman (1992) ). These networks are then distributed to consumers in one of two ways. Broadcast Networks like ABC, CBS, and NBC distribute their programming over the air via local broadcast television stations at no cost to households. Cable Television Networks like The Discovery Channel, MTV, and ESPN instead distribute their programming via cable or satellite television systems that charge fees to consumers. The dashed arrow between content providers and consumers represents the small but growing trend to distribute some content directly to consumer via the Internet (e.g. the television programs "Lost" and "Desperate Housewives").
6 Some audiences, represented by the dashed line at the right of the figure, are sold directly to advertisers by distributors of television networks, particularly those created by local or regional programming. Most audiences, however, are aggregated across distribution channels (e.g. the total viewers to ESPN across all cable and satellite systems) and sold to advertisers by program networks.
special-interest networks distributed nationally to systems via satellite. Examples include some of the most recognizable networks associated with cable, including MTV, CNN, and ESPN. Premium programming networks are advertising-free entertainment networks, typically offering full-length feature films. Examples include equally familiar networks like HBO and Showtime. Pay-PerView Networks are specialty channels devoted to on-demand viewing of high-value programming, typically offering the most recent theatrical releases and specialty sporting events.
Cable and satellite systems exhibit moderate differences in how they bundle networks into services. Broadcast and cable programming networks are typically bundled and offered as Basic Service while premium programming networks are typically unbundled and sold as Premium Services. 7 In the last decade, systems have begun to further divide Basic service, offering some portion of their cable networks on multiple services, called Expanded Basic and Digital Services. For either Basic or Expanded Basic Services, consumers are not permitted to buy access to the individual networks offered in bundles; they must instead purchase the entire bundle.
Regulation in Multi-Channel Television Markets Multi-channel television markets are subject to a number of regulations impacting network carriage and bundling decisions, prices, and other features of these markets.
The specific content of any cable service may not be regulated on First Amendment grounds. That being said, the 1992 Cable Act introduced two regulations that impact the networks that are offered on a cable system and how they are bundled into services for sale to households. First, the Act required the creation of a Basic tier of service containing all offered broadcast and publicinterest programming carried by the system. This Basic Service may also include some or many cable programming networks, at the discretion of the system. Many (though not all) systems responded to this regulation by introducing bare-bones "Limited Basic" services (often at a modest price around $10) containing only those networks they were required to offer. Second, the Act introduced Must-Carry/Retransmission Consent. These regulations give local broadcast stations the option either to demand carriage on local cable systems (Must-Carry) or negotiate with those systems for compensation for carriage (Retransmission Consent). 8
The 1992 Cable Act also re-introduced price regulation into cable television markets. Regulation differed by tiers of cable service and only applied if a system was not subject to "effective competition." 9 Basic tiers were regulated (if desired) by the local franchise (regulatory) authority, which 7 In the last 5 years, premium networks have begun "multiplexing" their programming, i.e. offering multiple channels under a single network/brand (e.g. HBO, HBO 2, HBO Family, etc.).
8 Smaller (esp. UHF) stations commonly select Must-Carry, but larger stations and station groups, particularly those affiliated with the major broadcast networks, have used Retransmission Consent to obtain compensation from cable systems, often in the form of carriage agreements for broadcaster-affiliated cable networks.
9 See Crawford (2006) A number of other regulations influence firm decisions in multi-channel television markets. In the programming (input) market, cable and satellite systems negotiate carriage agreements for program networks on a bilateral basis between a cable network (or network groups) and an individual system or system groups, also known as Multiple System Operators (MSOs). The 1992 Cable Act introduced rules that forbid cable and satellite systems and networks that are have ownership interests in each other from discriminating against unaffiliated rivals in either the programming or distribution markets. Furthermore, carriage agreements commonly have "Most Favored Nations" clauses that standardize terms between networks and cable systems of a given size.
There has been fewer regulations in the satellite television market. One of the most important, the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA), was passed on November 28, 1999 and permitted satellite providers to distribute local broadcast signals within local television markets. 10 This leveled the playing field between cable and satellite systems and established the latter as an effective competitor in U.S. multi-channel television markets. 11 Since 2002, satellite systems must distribute local signals must follow a "carry-one, carry-all" approach similar to Must-Carry and must negotiate carriage agreements with local television stations under Retransmission Consent (FCC (2005)). Unlike cable systems, satellite providers have never been subject to price regulations. 
The Advertising Market
Data Quality in Market Data
The Factbook data suffers from two weaknesses: the persistent non-updating of entries and incomplete observations. When comparing yearly entries on an individual cable system in Factbook, it is common to see that data does not change between two (and sometimes several) years. Given our knowledge of the industry churn rates, channel introduction during the relevant time period, and pricing behavior, we are certain that the data did not change in Factbook because it was not updated. It is extremely unlikely that the cable system's subscriber numbers, prices, or bundle composition did not change at all between two years. Another common occurrence when analyzing the Factbook is that a cable system will have a bundle listed as on offer, but no price and/or quantity is listed. We present statistics on the extent of these two data quality issues below in table.
These two data issues in the Factbook affect our approach to estimation. In particular, we worry that unobservable characteristics of the cable system are affecting whether an entry is updated or complete and, simultaneously, the quantities we are interested in analyzing. We will address these data concerns explicitly when describing identification in the model estimation section.
The Kagan data does not suffer from non-updating or incomplete observations. It is of higher quality in that dimension. Since the sources of the data are diverse and not systematic, it probably comes with sampling error. However, we can gather no evidence that the sampling error follows any pattern that would affect our use of the data.
The lack of detailed, system level quantity data for the satellite bundle poses a dilemma. Due to the aggregated nature of the satellite quantity data, standard demand models like the one we intend to use would not be identified without further data or assumptions. For lack of more data, we will make the following two assumptions. First, we assume the only satellite bundle in the DMA is the DirecTV total choice bundle (the mode). Second, within a DMA, the unobservable quality measure of this bundle does not vary across systems.
Exploitable Features of the Market Data
We highlight the amount of and variation in the market data that provides a crucial portion of the empirical evidence upon which our estimation and, ultimately, our policy recommendations depend.
[Price histogram, quantity histogram...]
Viewership Data
The viewership data comes from Nielsen Media research. Television ratings data is collected by different methods depending on the market and type of data. We use tuning data from the 55 largest DMA's for about 80 of the biggest cable channels over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] in each of the months February, May, July, and November (known for historical reasons as the sweeps months). The main variables are the DMA, the program, the network, and the program's rating. The rating is the percentage of television households in the DMA viewing the program. Nielsen data is commonly used throughout the television industry for a variety of purposes. Previous academic studies using similar data include Hausman and Leonard (1997) .
Data Quality in Viewership Data
Nielsen is the dominant provider of television ratings. It has a large staff dedicated to data quality, statistical integrity, and metering technology. Our data comes from Set Meters which measure electronically to what channel the television is tuned throughout the day. This data is then linked with which programs aired on the relevant channels.
Nielsen data has been criticized for accurately capturing the whole television universe.
Exploitable Features of the Viewership Data
We highlight the variation in the viewership data that provides the remaining portion of the empirical evidence at the foundation of our study. We aggregate the data to the channel/DMA/time level by averaging ratings across different shows on a given channel, DMA and month. We observe that channels' ratings vary from DMA to DMA. They also vary with the DMA's demographics and with the ratings of other channels. We present two examples of the underlying empirical evidence: the ratings of Black Entertainment Television in 55 DMA's for 2004 and the ratings of 50 channels in the New York City DMA in 2002 in the following figures. Table [Insert Table Here ] presents summary statistics for a subset of the data.
The Econometric Model
Our model of multi-channel television markets consists of three parts. On the demand side, we specify models of household viewing behavior and cable/satellite bundle purchases; on the supply side, we specify a model of optimal pricing of the observed set of bundles.
Household Viewing Model
Let j index a bundle of programming being offered by cable system n in DMA d (e.g. Comcast Digital Preferred in Arlington, VA). Suppose household i would decide to spend T ijn hours per month watching television if they had access to the C jn channels offered on bundle j in market n. Suppose the utility to household i from watching television took the familiar Cobb-Douglas (in logs) form:
where t icjn is the number of hours household i watches channel c and γ icn is a parameter governing i's tastes for channel c. 14 Whenever a channel subscript is omitted, e.g. as for t ijn , this is assumed to be the C jn × 1 vector consisting of t i1jn , t i2jn , . . . , t iC jn jn (and similarly for γ ijn , etc.)
Each household i is assumed to solve for its optimal time spent watching each channel according to:
subject to
If we further assume that there are constant returns to scale in viewing, i.e. ∂v ijn /∂ log T ijn = 1, the solution exhibits "Proportional Shares":
Plugging this back into Equation (2) yields indirect utility (from viewing):
This merely says that the indirect utility household i gets from bundle j in market n is a function of its preferences for the networks offered on bundle j, γ icn , c ∈ C jn , and the total time it would spend watching bundle j, T ijn .
Bundle Demand Model
To close our model of demand, we embed household i's indirect utility from viewing given by Equation (4) into a random-coefficient model of demand for bundles of multi-channel TV programming in the spirit of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) .
where, from (4), v * ijn is the indirect utility to household i from viewing all the channels on bundle j in market n, p jn and z jn are the observed price and non-price characteristics of bundle j in market n, α in and λ are household-specific and common, respectively, taste parameters measuring the marginal utility of income and tastes for non-price characteristics, and ξ jn and ijn are unobserved portions of household i's utility. Following standard practice, we assume that the unobserved term has a component which is common to all households in the market, ξ jn , and an idiosyncratic term, ijn . We further assume that the idiosyncratic term is an i.i.d. draw from a type I Extreme Value distribution.
The components of z jn indicates by which MSO, if any, the bundle is being offered, the year the bundle is being offered, and the name of the bundle. As a consequence of this specification, ξ jn is an aggregate term which represents the valuation of the deviation of unobserved bundle attributes from the MSO-year-bundle mean. These unobserved attributes include extra options such as Internet or high definition (HD) service, promotional activity, technical service, and quality of equipment.
A Critical Assumption Equation (5) can be translated into the canonical discrete-choice randomutility of, e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) , with an important additional assumption:
This states that household i's indirect utility from viewing can be captured by a scalar parameter, β icn , times a dummy variable indicating whether network c is offered on bundle j in market n. This is useful for estimation as it links information on viewing choices (i.e. ratings) with parameters governing subscription decisions (i.e. market shares).
How reasonable is this assumption? Modulo concerns about functional form, it is a conceptually weak assumption. It must be true that a household's marginal utility (equivalently, willingness-topay) for a network, β icn , depends in some way on how much it likes to watch that channel, itself given by preferences for overall (T ijn ) and channel-specific (γ icn ) television viewing. Equation (6) merely specifies an analytically convenient representation of that relationship. 15
Demand Summary We restate our composite demand model here:
We further assume that household-specific taste parameters, α in and β in , are given by the following parametric form:
where D in is an R × 1 vector of demographic characteristics, v in is are unobserved household tastes for networks distributed as a standard normal, Π is a (C + 1) × R matrix of preference parameters, and Σ is a (C + 1) × (C + 1) variance-covariance matrix of unobserved tastes. 16 Two features of (9) are worth mentioning. First, C and R are roughly 80 and 10 in our estimation, meaning there are many many free parameters in Π and Σ. This poses a significant challenge for contemporary estimation techniques using only market share data. Second, we intend to estimate a fully unrestricted variance-covariance matrix of unobserved household tastes. This too is unusual, as the same computational difficulties added to identification concerns mean that papers typically specify and estimate a diagonal Σ matrix (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) , Nevo (2001) , Petrin (2003) ). 17
Aggregating to Market Share Data Estimating the parameters in Equations (7) and (8) requires aggregating households' choices to the level of the market shares we observe in the data.
To do so, we normalize the utility of not subscribing to any bundle to zero and assume that each household subscribes to the bundle which delivers the highest positive utility, or, when no such bundle exists, to no bundle at all.
Before doing so, let the mean utility to bundle j in market n be given by
and let (most of) the unobserved component be given by
Substituting yields the following formulation for the indirect utility to household i from bundle j in market n:
Let A jn be the set of demographic and unobserved characteristics such that bundle j is chosen, i.e.
Then under the assumption that ijn ∼ Type I Extreme Value, the market share for bundle j in market n is given by
We describe our estimation strategy after introducing the supply side.
Pricing
We assume that each cable system choose the price of its offered bundles to maximize profits. Due to satellite systems' nationwide-pricing strategy, we assume they take satellite prices as given. Thus each cable system is a monopolist on the residual demand given by the aggregate demand for multi-channel television in market n less that supplied by satellite television systems.
Each system's problem is then
where r(s jn ) is an advertising revenue function, and mc jn are the marginal costs of providing bundle j in market n.
The first-order conditions for this problem are:
As these are not observed, we assume a functional form for the relationship between marginal costs and the derivative of the advertising revenue function and other variables in the data:
where w jn = vector of cost shifters (channel dummies, year, DMA, and MSO dummies) and ω jn is an unobservable stochastic term that assumed to distributed independently of w jn .
Estimation
We estimate the parameters of our model in two steps. We first estimate the parameters governing features of the distribution of marginal utility, Π and Σ, using ratings data. We then estimate β, θ, 13 and several additional parameters using our market data. It would be more efficient to estimate all the parameters jointly, but the very large number of parameters in Π and Σ foreclose this possibility. The resulting estimates are therefore consistent but not efficient.
Estimation on Ratings Data
Overview We use the relationship between the parameters of our household viewing and bundle demand models to motivate our first-stage estimating equations. In particular, recall
Because of this equality, we can take expectations of both sides of this equation, replace values of the expected share of time spent watching each channel within a DMA, E(γ icd ) = γ cd , with it's sample analog (the channel's rating within that DMA, r cd ), and estimate the values of Π and Σ using Ordinary Least Squares.
Details Taking the expectation of the left side of (16) across individuals within a DMA yields:
Before taking the expectation of the right-hand side of (16), we must manipulate it due to its nonlinearity in γ icd . Let γ cd be the expected rating for channel c in DMA d. Let T be the expected amount of time watching television across all households in the U.S.
If we take a first-order Taylor-Series expansion of γ icd log(γ icd T ijd ) around (γ cd , T ), we get
Taking expectations and dropping second-order terms yields: 18
where we
Equating Equations (17) and (??) yields the population relationship in the data.
Of course, we don't observe these population values. We only observe an estimate of them, r cd .
To estimate the values of the population parameters using this sample data, we must again take a Taylor-Series expansion, this time of the left-hand side of Equation (18) around r cd
where η cd = (1 + log(r cd T ))η cd . Collecting terms (and putting in vector notation) yields our estimating equation for Π:
where
. This simply says that the covariation in ratings data (controlling for demographics) corresponds to covariation in unobserved tastes for networks (Σ) times a heteroscedastic scale factor ((1 + log(r cd T ) 2 )).
First-stage estimation proceeds in two parts. We first conduct the regression in (21), yielding estimatesΠ andη d . Using these estimates, we calculateˆ cd =η cd /(1 + log(r cd T )). We then estimate the bc th element ofΣ = [ˆ bˆ c ].
Estimation on Market Share Data
GivenΠ andΣ, in the second stage we estimate the remaining parameters of the model following Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) . We use moments from both the bundle demand and pricing equations.
The Demand Side The demand-side moments are of the form
where δ jn (x jn , p jn ;Π,Σ, ·) is the outcome of the contraction mapping equating predicted and observed market shares for bundle j in market n and z d jn are demand-side instruments.
The components of the instruments z d jn follow standard practice in demand estimation on aggregate data. First, we allow observed product characteristics (largely dummy variables for each cable network), x jn , to instrument for itself. Second, we accommodate the endogeneity of price by instrumenting for it with p dma jn , where p dma jn is the average price of other cable systems bundles within the same DMA as cable system n. This will be a good instrument if, for bundle j in market n, (a) the unobservable demand shock, ξ jn , is uncorrelated and (b) "net" marginal costs are correlated with prices within n's DMA but outside market n. The latter will be true as labor costs and advertising rates are often correlated within DMAs. Following Hausman (1996) , these are often called "Hausman" instruments and have been successfully used in Nevo (2001) and Crawford (2007) ).
There are two important issues that arise with this specification. First, while there are two large satellite providers, we unfortunately only observe the aggregate satellite market share within each DMA. We therefore assume that there is just a single satellite product with characteristics given by the DirecTV Total Choice package (the most popular satellite package). 20 Second, we are assuming product characteristics, x jn , are exogenous. In related work, we have worked on relaxing that assumption (Crawford and Shum (2007) , Crawford and Shum (2006) , Ackerberg and Crawford (2007) ). We treat this as a maintained assumption for now and look to extend this work in that direction going forward. 21
The Supply Side The supply-side moments are of the form
where S jr,n = −∂s rn /∂p jn , j, r = 1, . . . , J n ,
and Ω jr,n = Θ jr,n * S jr,n .
As earlier, z p jn are supply-side instruments, with cost shifters, w jn , instrumenting for themselves and the predicted markup,markup jn , instrumenting for the markup jn . As the predicted markup is a function of exogenous variables and instruments from the demand side, this means we are effectively instrumenting for the markup with demand shifters.
Standard Errors
In the first-stage estimation, we calculate block-bootstrap standard errors allowing for correlation within DMA. In the second-stage estimation, there are three sources of error: Sampling Error, Simulation Error, and 1st-Stage Estimation Error. We calculate standard errors from sampling error as usual using the GMM formulas. Simluation error arises from simulating the values of the market shares s jn (x n , p n ). We calculate standard errors from simulation error by fixing Π and Σ at their estimated values and re-calculatingβ using different sets of simulation draws. 1st-Stage estimation error arises from using our estimates,Π andΣ when calculating market shares. We calculate standard errors from 1st-stage estimation error by fixing the simulation draws and recalculatingβ using draws from the estimated distribution of Π. As these three sources of error are independent, we can simply add them and calculate total standard errors (and associated test statistics) using these aggregates.
Results
Parameter Estimates
tables of parameter estimates and information conveyed by parameters identification of parameters from patterns in data Given the diverse set of data inputs and computational requirements of estimating the industry model, we present an appendix outlining the methods used for computation and data treatment in this study in order to aid attempts at replicating and extending this research.
A summary is presented here. We did numerical integration of functions formed from the demo- Table 4 : Price Elasticities Implied By Model and Estimates graphics distribution by pure random draws. We computed integrals formed from parameterized normal distributions by random draws according the the random Latin hypercube method 22 . We optimized the GMM objective function using a grid search over the range . • Consumers
The Incentives to Bundle
• Operators
• Channels (Subscription revenue, viewership, and advertising) 
